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[L. A: No. 21335. In Bank. May 4, 195L] 
J:AOK R. STEIN et al., Respondents, v. RUSSELL BROWN 
SIMPSON, .Appellant. 
' ~ ' ' ,, -' '' ' 
ll:quity"""-::1\iaxims~He Who· Seeks Equity· Must Do Equity.-
A .plaintiff may be required to do enuity in some>eases 
although d:til£endant. could n0t have obtained .such equity by 
independent ·action or as the· acting party. 
[2] Id~ 'Maxims:......He' Who. Seekw Equity Must Do EquitY:.-In 
• applying the maxim that· ''IH~ who. seeks equity must d? equity," 
the ~ourt does not cre&te substantive rights when the one who 
invokes the l:na:xim has none. 
Subrogation~Persons .Entitled.---The principle on which sub-
rogation is founded.applies·where .. one.per.soil, nota volun,teer, 
pays a debt for which imother is primarily answerable, .and 
w~i~h, ill equity and good conscience; should havebeen dis-
cliarged by the latter.··· 
[ 4] ld:---:-}Jer~Onfi E~~itled-'-Lienh9lders;:_Where .a . ju:ttior . lien-
hol!ler pay~ the depj;secur~dby a senior lieJI to );!~otect .his 
interest, .he b.~com~s su~rogated to. the rights .of the ~!)nior 
Hen~ol~er as aga~nst the. property. owner, although. he takes no. 
assignment of the !)enio:r lien. 
·xd.~Person:s Entitled---Volunteers.-The d()ctiine; of s~bro­
.. g~ti<ln i~ inappli~ltble ~p One who, in paying anOther's ·debt, 
!l'~t~ as a volunteer or ()fficJous intermeddler, b~t it may .be 
invoked by one who makes such payment to protect an interest 
of his own. 
~d."-Persons. Entj.tl~d---:-Li!lnholders.__, A person who dis~harges 
a lien 2noj;i~c]lrre{l}Jy.him o~ property not hisown, ,hut. whieh 
he mistakenly belilifes to he his, may he subrogated to the 
righ t!l. <>f the. lien4olaer .. 
!d.-Persons Entitled:_Liel1hold!lrs.-A ·Junior lienhol4er <Ja'll7 
not be said to have discharg~d . the supe:t;io:r lien, in the II1~s, 
taken belief that he then .had an interest in the property 
wh(lr~, with~ut reason, he. pre;viously refused tender of the 
full amount of his Mbt, . 
[l]..See 10 Q~l.J1lr;>508;19 A111.Jur. 319: 
L3] See. 23 Oal.Jur. 918; 50 Am.Jur. 696. 
[ 4] ~ight of junior en:eumbfancer<who disch~rges prier lien .t.o 
be subrogated•toadditional se.(lurity heldbyseniorlienor, .note, 145 
A.J:,.R. 738. See,also, 23 Cal.Jnr. 928; 50 .Am.Jur, 699, 746. · 
lVIcK. Dig, Referen,ces: [1, ~] Equity, §!;l9; 13, 5] Subr()gat~()n, 
§4; [ 4, 6, 7] Subrogation,• § 9; [8] Restitutioi.l; [9] Quieting Title, 
§114; [10] Judgments, §513; [11] Appeal and Error, §110. 
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[8] Restitution-Unjust Enrichment.-Property owners are not 
unjustly enriched by failure to require them to reimburse a 
junior lienholder who discharged a superior lien as part of his 
fraudulent scheme to obtain the property for less than its 
value. 
[9] Quieting Title-Judgment.-A judgment, in a quiet title 
action, adjudging that plaintiffs are not entitled to damages 
under specified provisions of the Civil Code, but adjudging 
them owners in fee of the property and adjudging also that 
defendants have no right, title or interest in the property, and 
that plaintiffs' title thereto is quieted and is free and clear of 
any lien, incumbrance or claim in favor of defendant, condi-
tioned on payment to defendant within a specified time after 
entry of judgment of a sum of money less costs, adequately 
sets .forth plaintiffs' rights. 
[lOa, lOb] Judgments-Payment-Tender.-Plaintiffs do not lose 
their rights under a judgment quieting title in them on condi-
tion that they pay defendant a sum of money, by their failure 
to make such payment where they make a timely tender, 
demanding satisfaction of the judgment, and where defendant's 
refusal thereof, based on his theory that such satisfaction 
would deprive him of his right to appeal, is without justifica-
tion, such payment not being put in jeopardy by the appeal. 
[11] Appeal-Right of Review-Loss of Right-Acceptance of 
Bene:fits.-The rule that acceptance of benefits under a judg-
ment foreclo~es the right to appeal therefrom has no applica-
tion where appellant is admittedly entitled to the benefits, or 
where they would not be affected or put in jeopardy by the 
appeal. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ben V. Curler, Judge.* Affirmed. 
Action to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Joseph D. Taylor and John W. Hill for Appellant. 
Cobb & Utley and Ernest R. Utley for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment quieting 
plaintiffs' title to real property on the condition that they 
pay defendant Simpson $12,000, less costs, within 30 days 
from notice of entry of the judgment. Simpson claims the 
amount payable should be $28,911.87. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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From the unchallenged findings of fact the following ap-
pears. Plaintiffs were the owners of property having a value 
of over $50,000. It was encumbered by a first trust deed 
securing a debt owed to Hollywood State Bank amounting to 
$18,000. Simpson loaned $20,000 to plaintiffs and demanded 
and received therefor two notes, each for $22,000, the addi-
tional $2,000 on each being a bonus demanded by Simpson. 
The notes called for interest at 7 per cent. One of the notes 
was secured by a second trust deed on the property and the 
other by a chattel mortgage on the furniture. At Simpson's 
request the notes were made payable to a third party, Simons 
(an employee of Simpson) who was to and did assign them to 
Simpson. (That was an attempt to avoid a claim of usury.) 
Each of the notes was payable in monthly installments of 
$2,000 from August 24, 1946, to January 24, 1947, when the 
balance became due. The $2,000 bonus was usurious interest 
charged by Simpson. Plaintiffs paid $8,000 on the notes, 
reducing the principal to $12,000, in accordance with the 
notes and a subsequent understanding in which additional 
interest amounting to $240 was to be paid. Various proper 
tenders of the balance due were made by plaintiffs or their 
agent to Simpson or his agent and refused. Simpson gave 
notice of default and election to sell, and the sale of the prop-
erty under the trust deed was scheduled for July 23, 1947. 
It was continued from time to time at Simpson's request to 
September 10, 1947, at 10 a. m. An hour before the sale, 
plaintiffs offered to pay the full amount which Simpson claimed 
was then due, and Realty Title Company, Simpson's agent 
for collection from plaintiffs, and trustee under the trust deed, 
advised plaintiffs that $16,641.13 was all that was required. 
Thereupon, and still before the sale, plaintiffs made a cash 
tender to Simpson of $17,000. The tender was refused, Simp-
son stating that he was interested in acquiring the property, 
not the money. The sale proceeded, Simpson bidding $36,000 
and plaintiffs' agent, Bassett, $50,000. Bassett having only 
$17,000 in cash with him, the title company, at Simpson's 
request, declared "all bids off" and started a new sale. The 
title company then announced that Simpson had paid the 
plaintiffs' debt to the Hollywood State Bank under the first 
trust deed in the sum of $17,380.85, and hence the sale would 
be for the amount represented by both trust deeds. Simpson 
had paid the bank the amount due on the first trust deed the 
morning of the sale. Bassett's request for a 24-hour postpone-
ment of the sale to obtain funds to cover his $50,000 bid was 
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refused at Simpson's direction. The sale proceeded, Bassett 
bidding $17,000 and Simpson $18,000. The property was sold 
to Simpson. The court found the sale invalid; that the amount 
owed by plaintiffs to Simpson under said notes and trust deeds 
was $12,000 and that amount is due without interest. 
The foregoing facts are undisputed, and with the other facts 
found, depict a shocking and unconscionable course of con-
duct by Simpson. 
The court also found: ''That in the payment to the Holly-
wood State Bank of the sum of $17,380.85 in satisfaction of 
its first trust deed, Simpson did not secure from the bank an 
assignment of said indebtedness, and his aforesaid satisfaction 
of said bank's note and trust deed was not disclosed to plain-
tiffs either at the time of their aforesaid redemption tender on 
said date or prior to the time Bassett had bid the sum of $50,000 
for said property. 
''That the Trustee's sale under Simpson's second trust deed 
advertised said property for sale subject to the Hollywood 
State Bank's first trust deed; that no one had demanded of 
Simpson the payment of said first trust deed and there was 
no reason appearing which would have then required Simpson 
to have paid and satisfied the bank's first trust deed in order 
that Simpson's interest might be protected; that Simpson had 
no property interest to protect at the time which would have 
required payment of the indebtedness due the bank and in 
paying and satisfying the bank's first trust deed, Simpson 
was a volunteer and Simpson's act and conduct in paying 
and satisfying the bank's first trust deed was only for the 
reason of springing a surprise upon plaintiffs and to enable 
him to acquire the property in question for himself at said 
Trustee's sale and at a price far below the real value of said 
property.'' Simpson does not question the factual matters 
in the finding last quoted, but asserts that the finding that he 
was a volunteer and had no interest to protect, is a conclusion 
of law. 
Simpson's contention is that he was not a volunteer; that 
he had an interest to protect, and that, therefore, he is entitled 
to have repaid to him the amount he paid the bank ($17,380.85) 
in addition to the $12,000. His claim is that "he who seeks 
equity must do equity" ( 10 Cal.J ur. 508), hence plaintiffs, 
who are seeking equity, must pay the amount he paid the bank. 
[1] It is true that the maxim applies, and a plaintiff may 
be required to do equity in some cases, though defendant could 
not have obtained such equity by independent action or as 
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the acting party. (Dool v. First National Bank, 207 Cal. 347 
[278 P. 233]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366 [123 P. 258, 
L.R.A. 1915C 492]; Pomeroy's Equity Jur., (5th ed.) § 386a). 
[2] It is also true, however, that in the application of that 
maxim the court does not create substantive rights under 
the guise of doing equity, that is, it does not confer rights when 
the one who invokes it has none (Rosenberg v. Lawrence, 
10 Cal.2d 590 [75 P.2d 1082] ; Lande v. Jurisich, 59 Cal.App.2d 
613 [ 139 P .2d 657] ) or as has been stated: ''With respect to 
the terms which may be imposed upon the party as a condition 
to his obtaining the relief in accordance with the rule,-that 
is, the 'equity' which he must do,-it is undoubtedly true, as 
said by Vice-Chancellor Wigram, that the court obtains no 
authority from this principle to impose any arbitrary con-
ditions not warranted by the settled doctrines of equity juris-
prudence; the court cannot deprive a plaintiff of his full 
equitable rights, under the pretense of awarding to the defend-
ant something to which he has no equitable right, something 
which equity jurisprudence does not recognize. The principle 
only requires the plaintiff to do 'equity.' According to its true 
meaning, therefore, the terms imposed upon the plaintiff, as 
the condition of his obtaining the relief, must consist of the 
awarding or securing to the defendant something to which he 
is justly entitled by the principles and doctrines of equity, 
although not perhaps by those of the common law,-something 
over which he has a distinctively equitable right." (Pomeroy's 
Equity Jur. (5th ed.), § 386.) 
[3] The right which Simpson claims he is entitled to have 
plaintiffs accord him here, in claiming equity, is that of sub-
rogation. ''The principle upon which the right of subroga-
tion is founded applies in all cases in which one person, not 
a volunteer, pays a debt for which another is primarily 
answerable, and which, in equity and good conscience, should 
have been discharged by the latter." (23 Cal.Jur., p. 918.) 
And the rule has found express application with reference 
to payment by a junior lien holder of a senior lien on the same 
property. "Every person, having an interest in property 
subject to a lien, has the right to redeem it from the lien, 
at any time after the claim is due, and before his right of 
redemption is foreclosed, and, by such redemption, becomes 
subrogated to all the benefits of the lien, as against all owners 
of other interest in the property, except in so far as he was 
bound to make such redemption for their benefit." ( Civ. 
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Code, § 2903.) "One who has a lien inferior to another, upon 
the same property, has a right: 
'' 1. To redeem the property in the same manner as its 
owner might, from the superior lien; and 
'' 2. To be subrogated to all the benefits of the superior lien, 
when necessary for the protection of his interests, upon satis-
fying the claim secured thereby." ( Civ. Code, § 2904.) 
[ 4] It is the general rule that where the holder of a junior 
lien on property pays the debt secured by a senior lien to 
protect his interest, he thereby becomes subrogated to the rights 
of the senior lienholder as against the owner of the property, 
even though he takes no assignment of the senior lien. (Diehl 
v. Hanrahan, 68 Cal.App.2d 32 [155 P.2d 853]; Swain v. 
Stockton Savings etc. Soc., 78 Cal. 600 [21 P. 365, 12 Am.St. 
Rep. 118] ; 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, §§ 23, 103.) 
[5] As appears from the rule of subrogation, the one in-
voking it must not have, in making the payment, been a 
volunteer-an officious intermeddler, or affirmatively he must 
have had some interest to protect. (See authorities cited 
supra; Guy v. Dtt Uprey, 16 Cal. 195 [76 Am.Dec. 518]; 
McMillan v. O'Brien, 219 Cal. 775 [29 P.2d 183]; Richards v. 
Griffith, 92 Cal. 493 [28 P. 484, 27 Am.St.Rep. 156] ; Bowman 
v. Sears, 63 Cal.App. 235 [218 P. 489] ; 23 Cal.Jur. 919; Rest., 
Restitution, § 162; 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, § 21; Pomeroy's 
Equity Jur. (5th ed.), § 1212.) 
Simpson does not dispute that at the time he paid the bank's 
trust deed his security-trust deed interest in the property was 
extinguished by reason of plaintiffs' tenders of payment. Thus 
it would appear he had no interest in the property when he 
paid the bank. He asserts, however, that he must have had 
an interest in the property, otherwise the court would not have 
required plaintiffs to pay the $12,000 due on their indebtedness 
to him. That is not persuasive, for he cannot complain if 
he obtained more than he should have, if that is the case. 
[6] In this same connection, he further argues that he 
thought he had an interest and that a payment of a superior 
lien by one under a mistaken belief that he has an interest to 
protect is not a volunteer. It has been held that where a person 
discharges a lien not incurred by him on property not his 
own, but which he mistakenly believes to be his, is subrogated 
to the rights of the lienholder. (Walker v. Walker, 138 Tenn. 
679 [200 S.W. 825]; Minchew v. Hankins (Tex.Civ.App.), 278 
S.W. 306; Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. 401 [9 N.E. 799] ; 
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Detroit &; Northern Michigan Bldg. &; Loan Assn. v. Oram, 
200 Mich. 485 [167 N.W. 50]; F~~ller v. Harwell, 126 Cal.App. 
654 [15 P.2d 562].) 
In Fu.ller v. Harwell, supra, 126 Cal.App. 654, property 
owned by Sue Harwell was subject to a mortgage given by 
her. Plaintiff had a judgment against her husband, T. J, 
Harwell, and levied execution on the property. On demand 
of the mortgagee he paid the mortgage. It was held that he 
was subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. In response to 
the contention that plaintiff never had an execution lien on 
the property as it did not belong to the judgment debtor, and 
that, therefore, he was a mere volunteer with no right of 
subrogation to the mortgagee, the court held that he was 
subrogated, stating that an ''apparent interest'' of the judg-
ment debtor is sufficient to support an "honest endeavor" to 
protect his asserted lien where he paid the mortgagor under 
the ''compulsion'' that he would have had to release his lien 
unless he did. Also, in the other cases cited supra, a point 
is made as to the honest belief and endeavor on the part of the 
claimed lienholder to protect his interest. It has been said 
in speaking of subrogation where a junior lienholder pays a 
senior lien: " ... the plaintiff is not officious, and he uses 
his property or his property is used in discharging the obliga-
tion of another or a lien upon another's property, he is entitled 
to reimbursement and is entitled to the remedy of subrogation 
to obtain reimbursement. The plaintiff is not officious where 
he makes the payment under a mistake, or where he is induced 
to make the payment by fraud or by duress (see §§ 43, 54). 
He is not officious where he was under a duty to make the 
payment, as for example where he was a surety (see § 76). 
He is not officious where he makes the payment to protect 
an interest of his own, as for example where the holder 
of a junior encumbrance discharges a prior encumbrance in 
order to prevent foreclosure (see § 104). The plaintiff is not 
officious where his property is used by another without his 
consent in discharging an obligation of the other or a lien 
upon the other's property (see § 207)." (Rest., Restitution, 
§ 162, com. b.) 
[7] Here it appears from the foregoing quoted finding 
that Simpson did not obtain an assignment from the bank; 
he failed to disclose his discharge of the bank's trust deed until 
the sale under his trust deed; the sale of the property was 
advertised as for the default on his trust deed; that no demand 
was made that he pay the bank and there was no reason which 
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would have required him to pay it; and that his conduct in 
respect to paying it and otherwise was to enable him to acquire 
the property for less than its value, rather than protect any 
supposed interest of his. Under those circumstances there 
was no mistake on his part of law or fact that he had to pay 
the bank to protect his interest or that he had any interest 
to protect. It is hardly credible that a person who has been 
tendered the full amount of the debt owed him and without 
reason refuses the tender, can be said to believe mistakenly 
that he has any further interest except the aim of obtaining 
the property for less than its value. 
[8] Simpson urges, however, that where a plaintiff must 
do equity to obtain equitable relief, defendant's motive is 
immaterial; that even though he was a volunteer and guilty 
of wrongful conduct, plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched if 
they are not required to reimburse him for his discharge of 
the bank's trust deed. It is said: "A person who without 
mistake, coercion or request has unconditionally conferred 
a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution, except 
where the benefit was conferred under circumstances making 
such action necessary for the protection of the interests of the 
other or of third persons." (Rest., Restitution, § 112.) Fur-
ther : ''A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another 
is not entitled to restitution therefor." (I d., § 2.) We believe 
those principles are applicable to a defendant who seeks to 
have an equity granted to him. Plaintiff is not "unjustly" 
enriched when the cause of the benefit conferred was the 
wrongful conduct of defendant. 
We think that Simpson's conduct was fraudulent, either 
aetually or constructively or at least tantamount to fraud, 
that is, an endeavor to unlawfully obtain plaintiffs' property 
for less than its value. It was more than merely having a bad 
motive. It was a fraudulent scheme carried to fruition by 
Simpson, and only the intervention of the court by this action 
prevented its full realization. The cases such as Bateman v. 
Kellogg, 59 Cal.App. 464 [211 P. 46]; Olivero v. Rosano, 
42 Cal.App.2d 740 [109 P.2d 976]; Wolfe v. Titus, 124 Cal. 
264 [56 P. 1042]; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Burke, 151 Cal. 616 
[91 P. 504] ; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra, 162 Cal. 366; and 
Dool v. First National Bank, supra, 207 Cal. 347, cited by 
Simpson are not in point. 
[9] Simpson asserts that the judgment is not clear that 
plaintiff's title is quieted, subject to the payment of the $12,000, 
less costs. It reads: "IT Is ... AD.JUDGED ... that plain-
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tiffs are not entitled to damages under and pursuant to the 
provisions of Sections 2941 and 3294 of the Civil Code of 
the State of California. 
"IT Is . . . ADJUDGED • . . that plaintiffs . . . are the 
owners in fee [of the property]. 
''That the defendants, or either of them, have no right, 
title or interest therein, and no lien or encumbrance of any 
nature or kind therein, and that plaintiffs' title to their said 
real property is quieted, and is free and clear of any lien or 
encumbrance or claim in favor of the defendant Russell Brown 
Simpson, the quieting of said title to said real property is 
conditioned upon the payment to the defendant, Russell Brown 
Simpson, of the sum of $12,000.00 less allowed costs herein, 
within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of notice 
of entry of this judgment and decree.'' We believe it is clear 
enough and adequately sets forth Simpson's rights. 
[lOa] Finally, Simpson asserts that plaintiffs have lost their 
right under the judgment to have their title quieted because 
they failed to pay the $12,000 less costs within 30 days after the 
notice of entry of judgment as provided in the judgment. 
It appears that a tender was made within the time, but that a 
satisfaction of the judgment was demanded by plaintiffs. 
Simpson refused the tender on the basis that if he gave a 
satisfaction he would lose his right to appeal. [11] The 
general rule is that the acceptance of benefits under a judg-
ment will foreclose the right to appeal therefrom. (Schubert 
v. Reich, 36 Cal.2d 298 [223 P.2d 242]; 2 Cal.Jur. 229.) 
However, ''The rule has no application where the benefits 
accepted are such that appellant is admittedly entitled to them 
or would not be affected or put in jeopardy by the appeal.'' 
(Schubert v. Reich, s1tpra, 300.) [lOb] All that Simpson 
is asking is that the judgment be modified so as to require 
payment to him of the $17,380.85, which he paid to the bank in 
addition to the $12,000. There is no dispute about the amount 
paid to the bank. Plaintiffs do not object to the require-
ment that the $12,000 be paid to Simpson. Thus, the re-
quirement that $12,000 be paid to Simpson is not put in 
jeopardy by this appeal. Hence Simpson should have 
accepted that tender and given satisfaction for it. As said 
in People v. Roath, 62 Cal.App.2d 241, 246 [144 P.2d 648]: 
"From what we have heretofore said it is at once apparent 
that respondents' claim in this regard cannot be upheld 
because an appellant is not precluded from prosecuting an 
appeal from a judgment in his favor when such appeal is 
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for the purpose of establishing a greater claim and where, as 
here, it affirmatively appears that he is entitled to that which 
he has accepted, but is contending for something more . . . 
Furthermore, where as in the case at bar, appellant accepted 
payment of a part of the judgment which was favorable to it, 
but the part adverse to appellant can be reversed without 
affecting the part which was favorable, the appellant is not 
estopped from prosecuting an appeal from that part of the 
judgment which was against it.'' 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., 'l'raynor, J., and Spence, J .. 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I can understand that the result reached 
by the majority deservedly, in a moral sense, punishes Simp-
son; but I think that in a legal sense it unjustly enriches the 
plaintiffs. I can agree with the majority that Simpson paid 
the bank loan because he thought that such procedure would 
aid him in securing the property at less than its reasonable 
value; but I think that it also indubitably appears that in so 
doing he labored under a mistake of fact or of law or of both 
fact and law. 
It seems to me there can be no doubt that Simpson did not 
intend to make a volunteer payment for the benefit of another; 
he believed that he had, an interest in the property and he 
believed that he was protecting and furthering that interest 
when he discharged the bank's lien. The bank's lien was 
valid; it was a bona fide prior charge against the property 
and payment of it protected that property against, and re-
lieved it of, the bank's claim. Such claim of the bank, 
existing against the property, was just as much adverse to 
plaintiffs as it was to defendant. In fact, with the extinction 
of defendant's lien, the lien of the bank was left as more 
substantially adverse to plaintiffs than to anyone else. 
Simpson thought he was paying off a charge against his own 
property; it developed that he paid a charge against plaintiff's 
property. Since plaintiffs receive the full benefit of the 
payment it seems to me that as a condition of quieting their 
title the court should require them to reimburse the payor. 
This conclusion appears to me to accord with the cases cited 
in the majority opinion. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
